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Abstract
Quantum key distribution(QKD) makes it possible for two remotely sep-
arated parties do unconditionally secure communications. In principle, the
security is guaranteed by the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics: if
any third party watches the key, she must disturbs the quantum bits there-
fore she has a risk to be detected. However, the security in practice is quite
different, since many of the assumptions of the ideal case do not exist. Our
presently existing secure proof of QKD protocols require the perfect random
number generators. Actually, we can never have perfect generators in the real
world. Here we show that the imperfect random numbers can also be used
for secure QKD, if they satisfy certain explicit condition.
Quantum key distribution(QKD) has abstracted strong interests of scientists since it makes
it possible to set up unconditional secure key between two remote parties by principles of
quantum mechanics. However, the unconditional security in principle does not necessarily
give rise to the unconditional security in practice, where many non-ideal factors occur. “The
most important question in quantum cryptography is to determine how secure it really is”
[1]. Different from the assumed ideal situation, there are many imperfections in realizing
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anything in the real world. Consider the case of QKD. These imperfections may include the
channel noise, small errors in source and devices, biased random number generators and so
on. So far, the security proof with channel noise have been given by a number of authors
[2,3,5–12]. The security was then extended to the case including small errors in source and
devices [13,14]. However, the effect of imperfection of random numbers is still unknown.
This causes problems in practice, though it is many people’s belief that sufficiently good
random numbers must also work very well. However, if the security is based on such a
belief, then it is still conditional security instead of the unconditional one and we don’t
know why this belief must be stronger than the beliefs on the assumed complexity of certain
mathematical problems which are the base of classical key distribution. Therefore a strict
proof is needed here for unconditional security of QKD in the real world. Without an explicit
analysis on the effect of imperfect random numbers, we don’t know how good is sufficient
therefore we have no choice but to blindly increase the quality of random number generators.
This can in principle raise the total cost unlimitedly. No matter how much we have done in
improving the quality of our random numbers, we still worry the security a little bit, e.g.,
we don’t know whether a bias of 10−10 or 10−30 undermines the security severely. The best
way to solve the issue is to give an explicit study on the effect of the imperfections with
certain operational criterion. We show that, a QKD with a good imperfect random number
generator (IRNG) with certain explicit condition is secure if the same QKD protocol with a
perfect random number generator(PRNG) is secure.
We start from the definition of a PRNG and quantifying of an IRNG. Consider the case
that the generator produces an ω-bit string, s. There are 2ω possible different strings in all,
we define all ω string as set {si, i = 1, 2 · · ·2ω}. An ω-bit PRNG is defined as a generator
which generates every string with equal probability over {si}, i.e., every string in {si} have
the same probability, 2−ω to be generated. If a generator generates ω−bit strings with a
non-uniform probability distribution over {si}, it is an imperfect random number generator,
IRNG. Specifically, we quantify the quality of an ω−bit random number generator by the
value of entropy: Suppose it generates string si with probability pi, the entropy
2
H(s) = −
i=2ω∑
i=1
pi log2 pi. (1)
In particular, we denote Rω,θ for an IRNG which generates ω−bit binary strings with entropy
−∑ pi log2 pi = θ. In case of PRNG, the probability distribution is uniform and the above
function reaches its maximum value ω. Given an IRNG, the entropy is always less than
ω. Here we shall consider the case of a good IRNG, of which the entropy value is ω − ǫ.
In practice, it is the case that Alice and Bob assume that they are using a perfect random
string but actually they are using an imperfect random string which is a little bit different
from the perfect one. It can also be the case that they only know the lower bound of the
quality of their generator, say H(s) ≥ ω − ǫ, but they don’t know the explicit pattern of
the strings and they have no way to change the generator to a perfect one. However, we
should assume the worst case that Eavesdropper (Eve) knows the pattern of their string
though they themselves don’t know it. For example, a very smart Eve could find out the
pattern from the history of the data. Also, in QKD, we assume Eve knows the protocol itself.
This means Eve knows the specific status of all the devices involved, including the random
number generators. Therefore, given the existing security proofs with PRNGs, we still worry
a little bit that Eve could take advantage of her knowledge about the IRNG being used in
the protocol and obtain a larger amount of information than the theoretical upper bound in
the case PRNGs are used. Our purpose is to see whether Eve can obtain significantly large
information to the final key generated by certain QKD protocol with good IRNG, if Eve’s
information to the final key by the same protocol with PRNG is in principle bounded by a
very small value. In all existing QKD protocols, both Alice and Bob needs some random
numbers for the task. For example, in BB84 protocol [4], Alice needs the random numbers
to prepare the initial quantum state |0〉 or |1〉 for each qubits; he needs to choose a subset
of the qubits for the error test and he also needs random numbers to make error correction,
privacy amplification finally. For all these issues, Alice only needs to prepare an ωa−bit
binary random string s in the beginning, if the protocol needs ωa random bits in all at
Alice’s side. In carrying out the protocol, Alice just reads s from left to right, whenever a
3
random bit is needed. Bob also needs random numbers to determine his measurement bases
({|0〉, |1〉} or {± = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)}). We at this moment assume Bob has perfect random
numbers while Alice does not. After we complete the proof of our Theorem, we extend it
to the case that Bob does not have perfect random numbers either. We shall first show the
following theorem:
Theorem: Given any QKD protocol P , suppose Bob always uses a PRNG and Eve knows
what random generators are used by Alice and Bob, if Eve’s information is bounded by ǫ0 in
the case that Alice uses a PRNG, then Eve’s information to the k−bit final key is bounded
by
ǫ0 + (4k + 1)
√
ǫA/2 +O(ǫ
3/2
A ) +O(ǫA)
to the final key in the case Alice uses an IRNG, Rωa,ǫA.
For clarity let us first recall the theorem of Holevo bound [15,16].
Clare announces the following facts: He will Alice an ωa−bit state which can be either ρ0
or ρ1, with equal probability. He sets his bit value X = 0 if he passes ρ0 to Alice, and
X = 1 if he passes ρ1 to Bob. It’s known to all parties that ρ0 = (2
−ωa)
∑
2ωa
i=1 |si〉〈si| and
ρ1 =
∑
2ωa
i=1 pi|si〉〈si|. State |si〉 is a product state of ωa qubits with each of them being
prepared in {|0〉, |1〉 basis. String si gives the full information of state of each qubits, e.g., if
sj = 01010011 · · ·10, then |sj〉 = |01010011 · · ·10〉. In such a case, using Holevo’s theorem
[15] we find that Alice’s information to bit X is bounded by
h = H(p¯)− ωa
2
− 1
2
H(p) (2)
and p = pi In fact, in this case, if Alice directly observes each qubits in {|0〉, |1〉} basis she can
reach the upper bound of information to X . With a little bit calculation, one immediately
obtain the fact that
h ≤ ǫa/2. (3)
In what follows we shall show that, with the restriction by Holevo’s theorem, Eve’s informa-
tion to the final key must be negligible in a QKD with good IRNG Rωa,ǫA, if her information
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is in principle negligible in the same QKD protocol with perfect random numbers. We now
consider the following game
Game G: Clare announces that he will pass Alice an ωa−bit state which can be ei-
ther ρ0 or ρ1, with equal probability, and he sets his bit value X = 0 if he passes
ρ0 = (2
−ωa)
∑
2ωa
i=1 |si〉〈si| to Alice, and X = 1 if he passes state ρ1 =
∑
2ωa
i=1 pi|si〉〈si|. to
Bob. Alice measures each qubits of the state from Clare in {|0〉, |1〉} basis and obtain a
classical string s. Using s as the random string Alice runs QKD protocol P with Bob. At
this moment Eve attacks the protocol just as if she were a real eavesdropper. If the protocol
does not pass the error test, Alice gives it up and uses string s to obtain the information
about X , in such a case she can reach the Holevo bound. If the protocol passes the error
test, they continue and set up a k−bit final key Y and then Alice announces it. In such
a case, Eve can obtain information about X by reading the final key, and Eve reports her
information about X to Alice and Alice uses this as her own information about X . Obvi-
ously, Eve’s information about X must also be bounded by h, otherwise the result of our
game violates Holevo’s theorem.
Suppose scheme T is the optimal attack to QKD protocol P with imperfect random
string whose Shannon entropy is ǫA (but T is not necessarily optimal to the same protocol
with perfect random string). Suppose Eve attacks Y by scheme T . Without any loss of
generality, T has the following property: if string s used by Alice is perfectly random, Eve
acquires information ǫ′ about Y . If s is from generator Rωa,ǫA, Eve’s information about the
final key is optimized, we denote it by η in such a case. In our game Rωa,ǫA corresponds to the
case X = 1. Intuitively, η should not be too large given ǫ′ being very small, since otherwise
after Alice announces Y , Eve may easily see whether her actual information about Y prior
to the announcement is η or ǫ′ therefore she can access an unreasonably large amount of
information about Clare’s bit X . After attack T , Eve has 2 sets of probability distribution
P = {Pi}, Q = {Qi} about the k−bit final key Y , conditional on X = 0, 1, respectively.
Before reading final key Y , these two sets of distribution about Y have equal probability.
More specifically, after reading the final key Y , the two distributions P and Q can be
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different. Therefore probability of X = 0 and X = 1 can also be different after Eve reads
Y . That is to say, in reading Y , Eve may obtain different probabilities for the probability
distribution P and Q.
For simplicity, the two probabilities for a specific possible final key, Yj. Consider one possible
way for Alice to violate the Holevo’s theorem: If the final key is not Yj , she disregard the
QKD result just uses string s itself and obtain information about X in the amount of Holevo
bound. If the final key is Yj, she announces Yj and uses Eve’s information about X as her
own information. Therefore, Eve’s two probabilities (Pj , Qj) about any Yj cannot be too
different, otherwise Alice has non-zero chance to violate Holevo’s theorem. Specifically, we
have the following restriction
IE(X : Yj) = 1− 1
2
H(P ′j)−
1
2
H(Q′j) ≤ h. (4)
Here P ′j =
Pj
Pj+Qj
, Q′j =
Qj
Pj+Qj
and H(t) = −t log2 t − (1 − t) log2 t. For simplicity we shall
use log instead of log2 hereafter. The above formula is equivalent to
IE(X : Yj) = 1 +
1
2 + δ
log
1
2 + δ
+
1 + δ
2 + δ
log
1 + δ
2 + δ
≤ h. (5)
Here δj is defined by δj = Qj/Pj − 1 = Q′j/P ′j − 1. After a further reduction we obtain
IE(X : Yj) = − 1
(2 + δj)
log(1 + δj/2) +
1 + δj
2 + δj
log
(
1 +
δj
2 + δj
)
(6)
If δj ≥ 0, we have
IE(X : Yj) ≥ − δj
2(2 + δj)
+
(1 + δj)
(2 + δj)
[
δj
2 + δj
− δ
2
j
2(2 + δj)2
]
≥ δ
2
j
2(2 + δj)3
; (7)
if δj < 0, we have
IE(X : Yj) ≥ − 1
(2 + δj)
(δj/2 + δ
2
j/8) +
δj(1 + δj)
(2 + δj)2
≥ 2δ
2
j − δ3j
8(2 + δj)2
≥ 2δ
2
j
8(2 + δj)2
. (8)
In any case, we have
|δj | ≤ |∆ = 4[1 +O(
√
h)]
√
h (9)
6
for any j, given the restriction of formula (4). With this formula, we can now calculate
the lower bound of H(Q), the entropy to the whole k−bit final key, given distribution
Q = {Q = i}.
H(Q) = H({Pi(1 + δi}) = −
∑
i
Pi(1 + δi) log[Pi(1 + δi)]
≥ (1− |∆|)H(P )− (1 + |∆|) log(1 + |∆|)
≥ k − ǫ′ − (4k + 1)[1 +O(
√
h)]
√
h−O(h). (10)
Since h ≤ ǫA/2, we have
η ≤ ǫ′ + (4k + 1)[1 +O(
√
h)]
√
h−O(h). (11)
Note that we always have ǫ′ ≤ ǫ0, since ǫ0 is the upper bound of any attacks to a QKD
protocol with PRNG, ǫ′ is the information through T , which is an optimized attack to QKD
with IRNG, but not necessarily also an optimized attack to the same QKD protocol with
PRNG. Therefore we complete the proof of our theorem by replacing ǫ′ with ǫ0. Now
we consider the case that Bob’s random string is also imperfect, say, he uses an IRNG
Rωb,ǫB . Since we have already known that Eve’s information is bounded by ǫ0+(4k+1)[1+
O(
√
h)]
√
h − O(h) we the case that Alice uses IRNG and Bob uses PRNG, we now just
consider game G′ where David passes Bob an ωb−qubit state |ρ′0〉 =
∑
2ωb
i=0 |si〉〈si| if he sets
X = 0 and passes Bob an ωb−qubit state |ρ′1〉 =
∑
2ωb
i=0 |si〉〈si| if he sets X = 0 and passes
Bob an ωb−qubit state |ρ′1〉 =
∑
2ωb
i=0 p
′
i|si〉〈si| if he sets X = 1. Similarly to the proof for our
theorem, we have the following corollary: Suppose Eve always knows what random number
generators are used by Alice and Bob in a certain QKD protocol P . If Eve’s information is
upper bounded by ǫ0 to the final key in the case PRNGs are used, then Eve’s information is
upper bounded by η ≤ ǫ0+(4k+1)
√
ǫA/2+ (4k+1)
√
ǫB/2+O(ǫ
3/2
A )+O(ǫA) to the k− bit
final key in the case Alice uses IRNG Rωa,ǫA and Bob uses IRNG Rωb,ǫB .
We conclude that, if a QKD protocol is secure with perfect random numbers being used, it
must be also secure with exponentially small imperfections in the random numbers. Therefore
perfect random nember generators wchich never exist in the real world are not necessary for
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secure QKD.
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